Security
MaxClawOS Wallet is connected by a cable, so it is not a sealed box with no port. The isolation is narrower and more useful: the seed never crosses that cable.
Companion software on the computer prepares an unsigned request and sends it over USB-C.
MaxClaw OS parses the request and paints the address and the action on the OLED. That paint is not a screenshot from the computer.
Both buttons together approve. One button, the left, clears the screen and drops the request.
The element signs inside the chip. The computer receives the signature and nothing it could use to sign a different request later.
It can prepare a request, display its own copy, and broadcast a finished signature. It cannot read the seed, export it, or approve a session by clicking a button in a window. A click on the computer is not a press on the metal.
It answers a class of mistakes that showed up as soon as people kept long-lived keys on everyday laptops and phones: malware that rewrites an address on screen, and a hurried confirmation of a page the computer drew. The second screen is the countermeasure. We describe it further in the screen note.
A signing device does not make a person careful. If the words on the recovery card are photographed, stored in a mailbox, or read to someone on a phone, the element cannot help. If both the device and the card are lost, the studio cannot reconstruct the key, because we never held it.
We do not claim a government certification score for this enclosure, and we do not claim the device is beyond physical study. The design goal is the one the category settled on a decade ago: a readable screen, plus a chip that is a worse place to steal a key from than a general-purpose computer.
KLA Waterman, LLC does not buy, sell, exchange, or trade crypto assets. The security model above is a description of hardware. It is not a financial service and not custody.
